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Quantum Encryption Course Module Prerequisites

A Presentation of the Prerequisite Topics and a Module for
a Quantum Encryption (QE) Topic in an IS Course
Ronald I. Frank, DPS
Pace University
rfrank@Pace.edu
ABSTRACT

I present a variant of the quantum encryption (QE) algorithm and an elementary outline of the quantum mechanics (QM)
axioms and math results that make it work. There are two points in the algorithm where QM plays a role. One is a quote of a
deep theorem that makes acceptable sense in light of the outline of axioms. The second is only an application of vector
representations in a basis. Another topic appears throughout: discrete probability. Using this insight, I present an outline of a
prerequisite topic review module for an IS course introducing QE. Available by email from me are a Java console
application interactive QE Simulator, and extensive slide sets on background material at various levels of difficulty. This
discussion assumes some familiarity with the very basics of cryptography (one-time-pads, sending in the clear, symmetric
keys etc.).
Keywords

Quantum Encryption, Educational Materials. Quantum Cryptography, IS Curriculum
INTRODUCTION

Encryption is an important topic in Information Assurance (Security) courses, Telecommunications, and Networking
Courses. A modern form of encryption, Quantum Encryption (QE), is based upon fundamental physical phenomena and
mathematical procedures that are not usually included in the preparation of most IS people. QE is of increasing interest
because it is theoretically unbreakable, and it is now readily available in current products (IdQuantique, 2003; MagicTech,
2003). I have previously presented an argument and implementation plan for introducing QE into the IS curriculum in
(Frank, 2003). I present here an outline of a reasonable selection of the prerequisite topics needed to attain a better
understanding of QE. I assume knowledge of basic Algebra, basic Trigonometry {of 45° triangles}, and the definition of
discrete probability, but they could be part of the review module. No calculus topics are used.
Clearly, IS people need not study all the mathematics and physics that would be necessary to do research in QE. In fact, we
can’t even assume they have the “educated layperson’s” background for just appreciation of the topic. The need is to supply
some basic and intermediate level of preparation and understanding. The ideal preparation would consist of full courses in
linear algebra, probability, and a general introduction to modern physics including quantum mechanics, but this is not in the
IS curriculum (Gorgone, Davis, Valacich, Topi, Feinstein, and Longenecker, Jr., 2002). The next best strategy is to provide a
“fly-by”, or high-level overview, of the most relevant topics. A fly-by can be, for example, a set of topics that illustrate the
basic results that are behind QE, without giving their derivation. This topic set can provide an appreciation for the
procedures of QE but without of course, a deep understanding.
First we should state the QE algorithm and discuss why it is strong. The suggested fly-by would focus on a statement of the
axioms of quantum mechanics and the basic linear algebra of state vectors and their implications for QE. Quantum
mechanical measurement is the bridge from the QM axioms to the QE procedure, which is essentially a quantum mechanical
measurement process of the state vectors representing transmitted polarized light as waves or photons (the particles of light).
This is inherently probabilistic. The QE algorithm which I discuss (Johnson, 2003; Nielsen and Chuang,, 2000; Singh, 2002;
Tanenbaum, 2003) depends upon the properties of the representations of those state vectors in alternate bases determined by
alternate measurement filters.
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THE QE ALGORITHM (DEPENDS UPON QUANTUM MEASUREMENT OF LIGHT)

The Quantum Cryptography research literature (ArXiv.org, 2004) shows this algorithm be a useful simplification. Alice
transmits to Bob. Eve is the (possible) eavesdropper. The point is to get a secure symmetric one-time-key to Bob. Onetime-keys are known unbreakable (Singh, 2002). Optional Eve filters (measures) photons and passes them on, thus affecting
them in a quantum probabilistic way as we shall see.
There are two sets of filters called + and X. The + set is { |, -- } a vertical and a horizontal polarizing filter. The X set is {
\, / } a 45° left rotated filter and a 45° right rotated filter. Alice chooses a random set of bits for the symmetric key, which is
longer than she needs since she will lose some in the process below. Next, Alice converts the bits into a random choice of
filter sets, with the correspondence: 1 corresponds to | or \ , and 0 corresponds to -- or /.
Alice transmits the photons using these filters. Bob receives these photons using a randomly chosen set of filter sets and
filters from those sets. He has a 50% chance of choosing the same filter set. If he chooses the wrong filter of the set, he still
can figure out what bit was sent (as we shall see). If he chose the wrong filter set, he has no way of knowing what the photon
he measured means (as we shall see).
Alice will call Bob in the clear and read off her filter SET choices (not her bits and not her actual filters). If Bob chose a
matching filter, he knows the bit sent. If he chose the wrong filter set, they both have to drop that bit since he does not know
it. Bob tells Alice which of his sets matched. Those determine a subset of the bits sent that they both know.
Quantum Encryption Algorithm (Johnson, 2003; Nielsen and Chuang,, 2000; Singh, 2002; Tanenbaum, 2003)

1.

Alice sends n random bits (photons) using a random choice of n filters. Alice knows her bits and filters.

2.

Bob uses a random choice of receiving filters.
•Bob knows his measured bits and his filters.
•Some measured bits are errors because he chose the non-matching (incorrect) filter set.
•An incorrect filter set gives a bit error 50% of the time.
•A correct (matching) filter gives a correct bit 100% of the time.
Some of Bob’s bits might actually be bad because Optional Eve passed on modified bits.

3.

Alice phones Bob in the clear and tells him her sequence of filter SETS (Eve could hear this).

4.

Bob tells Alice which of his sequence of filter SETS agree (Eve could hear this).
•This determines a secret set of M known bit values. (Some might be wrong if there was an Eve.)
•This is a symmetric key for encryption - if no Eve.

5.

•Alice phones Bob in the clear and reads to him a discardable subset of her actual bits. If Bob agrees, there has been
no Eve. Otherwise, there has been an Eve, so they must discard ALL bits and start over!

Quantum Encryption Results – Best Case (no restart)

1.

This leaves a long random bit string that is secret and has not been read by an Eve (probability~1).

2.

This bit string is used as a secure symmetric key for a one-time-pad.

3.

The Navajo box (MagicTech, 2003), a QE network appliance, generates new keys every 10 ms (100/sec).

Quantum Encryption One-Time-Pad

One-time-pads are known (i.e., proven) unbreakable. (Singh, 2002, pp. 120-124)
Quantum Encryption - Eve Eavesdropping

Any attempt to read (i.e., filter or measure) an unknown photon and pass it on unchanged will introduce a probabilistic error.
There is a QM no cloning theorem that applies here. Eve can’t copy a photon, pass one on to Bob, and measure her copy.
Cloning involves reading a photon. Reading means applying a filter. Eve can only pick a random choice of filters that can
introduce a random change to a photon – sometimes no change if they match, and sometimes a change if they don’t match.
Only if her filter happens to match the filter used by Alice to send the original photon is there no error Eve can’t know if her
filter matches at the time of measurement. This is discussed further below.
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Quantum Encryption Summary

1.

•We can securely transmit an unbreakable one-time-pad (symmetric key) of any desired length if no Eve.

2.

•We can virtually ALWAYS detect eavesdropping.

Quantum Encryption “UML” Summary
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The gray process indicates where quantum mechanics is involved.
Figure 1. QE with no Eve
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QM No Cloning Theorem
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The gray processes indicate where quantum mechanics is involved.
Figure 2. QE with an Eve

Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004

4488

Frank

Quantum Encryption Course Module Prerequisites

MATH AND PHYSICS BACKGROUND
Informal Axioms of Quantum Mechanics (QM)

1.

Observables (physically measurable values) are represented by hermitian matrices H (operators) that have a
complete basis set of eigenvectors. (This is the linear algebra mentioned in the introduction).

2.

The basis is in a hermitian inner-product space (product of vectors giving a complex number).

3.

A “pure” state of the observable is an eigenvector (part of a basis of the space that H acts upon).
•

A superposition state is a general vector, a sum (mixture) of pure states.

4.

A measurement causes a projection onto a pure state vector (part of a basis of the space that H acts on).

5.

A possible measured value is the eigenvalue (always real) of H. Not the coordinate of the projection in 4.

6.

The probability of finding this real measurable value is the square of the coordinate of the normalized form
of the full state vector, in the direction of the pure state basis vector. (The coordinate is not equal to the
eigenvalue, in general.) In our case it is the square of the direction cosine.
(We don’t directly use hermiticity above, or axioms 7-11 below. Our observable is Polarization.)

7.

Observables come in Fourier Transform (FT) (conjugate pairs) (that do not commute).
•

Ex: Position x and momentum p.

•

Ex: Spin z component and Spin y component.

8.

Non-conjugate variables commute (This means they are simultaneously measurable).

9.

A full measurement is represented by a full set of commuting operators and their eigenvalues at a common
eigenstate.
•

Ex: Spin z component and |S| (total spin).

•

(X, Y, Z) position of a particle or (Px, Py, Pz) its momentum, but not both.

10. FT Uncertainty Relation == Heisenberg’s for Conjugate Variables (amount of non commutation).
11. Time evolution is done by Unitary Operators e. g. exp(iHt) times (state vector) = (later state vector).
Comments on the Axioms and QE

We can see that the axioms use a lot of matrix (operator) theory. We can neglect most of these topics. However, the mental
model of vectors in a space with projections onto basis vectors is important – so we have to provide some fly-by of these
topics. The fact that we are in a 2-dimensional space yields a great simplification. QE uses only a 2-dimensional real state
space so that two dimensional vector diagrams are sufficient to introduce the two filter set coordinate systems which are at 45
degrees to each other. One is the usual X, Y system (+) and the other (X) is the X,Y system rotated 45° to the left (counter
clockwise). A state is a direction of photon linear polarization. There are 4 directions used, |, --, \, and /.
There is one theorem in QM that we use, other than the axioms. It is the No Cloning Theorem, which is a careful statement
that you have to measure a thingie if you want to know the thingie. However, a measurement changes it into the value and
state you get out of the measurement. The result is that you are left forwarding on a copy only of that which you got out from
the measurement and not necessarily a clone of the original input.
QE only uses a 2-dimensional state space, so the math review contains only two dimensional vector diagrams sufficient to
introduce coordinate systems at 45 degrees to the usual X, Y system. 2-D QM is simpler than the general case.
Polarization Filters

The system we think about is a particle of light (a photon) moving in a direction of propagation and having a plane of
polarization of its associated electric field perpendicular to the direction of propagation. We will diagram the light as coming
OUT of the page, and the electric field filling the page. Polarization means that we can limit the electric field to vibrate along
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a FIXED line over time rather than changing direction in the plane as time goes on. The things that do this are called linear
polarization filters. They have a fixed direction axis along which the polarization happens.
Linear polarization of light is caused by passing the light through a linear polarization filter. Anyone who has used a
photographic polarization filter or has used polaroid glasses has used such a filter. Once filtered, the light stays polarized
until it passes through another filter. There is a measured loss of light after passing through the second filter. The magnitude
of the loss goes as the square of the cosine of the angle between the directions of polarization (as a multiplier). Since cosine
90 degrees is 0, two parallel polarization filters whose directions of polarization are at right angles cause complete loss of
transmission of the light passing through them.
Polarization Filter
Direction of
Linear
Polarization

Light ray
coming
out of page

Figure 3. Planar polarization filter
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Linear
Polarization
(in the plane
of the filter)

(/)

Direction of
Linear
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(in the plane
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Light ray
passing
through two
filters whose
axes are at
45 degrees

Figure 4. Tandem planar polarization filters viewed from an angle
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Direction of
Linear
Polarization
of second
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Figure 5. Tandem planar polarization filters viewed from straight on

( | and / )
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Space, Vectors, Bases, Cosine, Components and Coordinates

A space is a set. The space we use here is the set of points called the two dimensional plane (2-D plane). This is the
polarization plane. A vector is a direction and a length in that set. We choose, arbitrarily, two directions as a coordinate
system. We usually choose the horizontal and vertical directions, but we could choose the upper left-lower right 45-degree
direction and the upper right lower left 45-degree direction – if we want to (and we WILL want to shortly). A basis is a set
of two vectors along those two coordinate directions. They are called a basis because they can be used as a basic set to define
all of the other possible vectors in the plane by addition. We will call the two bases + and X.
Usual X, Y
basis

|

\

/

Another basis
at 45 degrees
45
degrees

45
degrees
45
degrees

--

Figure 6. Two basis sets in a 2-dimensional space

Arbitrary other vector
represented by a sum of its
component vectors along
the basis directions

Figure 7. A general 2-D vector represented as a sum of its basis components in (+)

Arbitrary other vector
represented by a sum of its
component vectors along
the basis directions

Figure 8. The general 2-D vector represented as a sum of its basis components in (X)
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A triangle, an angle, and its
Cosine = (a/H)

e)
s
H nu
e
ot
p
y
(h
Angle θ
(greek theta)

o
(opposite side)

a
(adjacent side)
Figure 9. The definition of cosine

cos(θ ) = ( Ha )
A vector can be written with an underline (e. g., v). If the basis set vectors are e1 and e2, the representation of v is
v = (ae1 + be2). ae1 is the component of v along e1, and be2 is the component of v along e2. a and b are its coordinates in the
given basis. The coordinates change if we represent the vector in a different basis.
This now allows the representation of the vector in a given assumed basis to be written as a tuple of its coordinates, here as v
= (a, b). IF H is of length one, the coordinate a is = the cosine of the angle. If H lies along a, cosine of 0 is 1 = cosine
squared of 0.
Operators, Matrices, Eigenvectors, Eigenvalues, and Normalization

An operator maps vectors in a space into other vectors. A linear operator, M, is defined as:

M (ae1 + be 2 ) = M (ae1 ) + M (be 2 ) = aM (e1 ) + bM (e 2 ) .
A linear operator in our 2-D space is represented by a matrix acting on the coordinates. The operators of the kind we use all
have the property that when they map the space of n-dimensions, they leave an N-vector basis unchanged in directions.
These are called the operator’s eigenvectors. They may change the lengths of their eigenvectors. The length stretch factors
are called the operator’s eigenvalues.

M (v) = λ ( v ) v is an eigenvector of M and λ is the eigenvalue corresponding to v.

Notice that we could multiply the vector by a constant k to change only its length to make it length one without changing
either its nature as an eigenvector or changing the eigenvalue:

kM (v) = k λ ( v ) = M (kv) = λ ( kv ) .

To simplify computation, we normalize everything in sight. We make the eigenvectors to be of length one. Only their
direction counts. This means then, that if we normalize any arbitrary vector (to length one), the sum of squares of its
components on the basis vectors sums to one (the very definition of normalization). They will be used as probabilities (they
are all positive and sum to one). See below.
Observables, Quantum States, and Pure States

A physically observable thingie (an observable) such as photon polarization, is represented by an operator (matrix). We
often don’t need the operator if we can somehow know its eigenvalues and eigenvectors. In fact in this case all we need to
use is its eigenvectors and the knowledge that they function as needed in QM.
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A state of a quantum system (e. g., our photon’s polarization) is represented mathematically by a vector in the vector space
determined by the normalized eigenvectors of the observable’s operator. The eigenvectors of an observable’s operator are
called Pure States. In our case, we have the 2-D plane of polarization. Any linear polarization can be represented by a 2-D
vector in that plane. We use the eigenvectors of the polarization operator as a basis without knowing the operator.
Observations, Measured Values, and Probabilities.

An observation of an observable (an experiment) yields a real value. The possible measured values of an observable in an
observation are its eigenvalues. A pure state (eigenvector) going into the experiment yields the eigenvalue of the state, which
comes out unchanged. Any other mixed state (represented as a weighted sum of the basis eigenvectors) yields only an
eigenvalue of a single output pure state, which itself is the state result of the experiment. Mixed in – pure out.
Remember that the coordinate of an arbitrary vector of LENGTH ONE in a basis is the cosine of the angle between the mixed
vector and the basis vector.
The probability of finding a given eigenvalue (and therefore its corresponding pure state as an outcome) is the square of that
normalized coordinate (not the square of the eigenvalue). Remember that by normalization, the squares of the coordinates of
an arbitrary mixed state sum to 1, so can be considered probabilities. This is from axioms 5 and 6 above. This will explain
the cosine squared attenuation of polarized light below.
Pairs of Filters (Filter Sets) as Basis Choosers.

A vertical filter lets through vertically polarized light with probability one and any other polarization light with probability
cosine squared of angle to the vertical. A horizontal filter lets through horizontally polarized light with probability one and
any other polarization light with probability cosine squared of angle to the horizontal. Notice that horizontal light won’t pass
a vertical filter (cosine 90 degrees = 0). Vertical light won’t pass a horizontal filter for the same reason. These make good 0
and 1 bits. A filter pair | and -– pass eigenvectors (polarization states) which are orthogonal and therefore form a basis of
the 2-D space of polarization. I.e., any other polarization vector, say \ passing through either of + (|, or --) will be
represented as a sum of | and-–. ( \ ) = ⎛ 1 ⎞ (|) − ⎛ 1 ⎞ ( − ) and ( / ) = ⎛ 1 ⎞ (|) + ⎛ 1 ⎞ ( − ) . This is normalized to length
⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎝ 2⎠
⎝ 2⎠
⎝ 2⎠
⎝ 2⎠
one. Underline means state vector. Of course (|) = (1)(|) + ( 0 )( − ) and ( − ) = ( 0 )(|) + (1)( − ) (probabilities 1 or 0).
Similarly, a 45-degree left filter (\) lets through 45-degree left polarized light with probability one and any other polarization
light with probability cosine squared of angle to that direction. A 45-degree right filter (/) lets through 45-degree right
polarized light with probability one and any other polarization light with probability cosine squared of angle to that direction.
Notice, 45-degree right light won’t pass a 45-degree left filter (cosine 90 degrees = 0). A 45-degree left light won’t pass a
45-degree right filter for the same reason. These also make good 0 and 1 bits. The normalized length-one representation is:
uuuv
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ 1 ⎞
and ( \ ) = (1)( \ ) + ( 0 )( / ) and ( / ) = ( 0 )( \ ) + (1)( / ) .
⎟(\) + ⎜
⎟ ( / ) and ( − ) = − ⎜
⎟(\) + ⎜
⎟(/)
2
2
2
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠
⎝ 2⎠

(|) = ⎜

It is now central to notice that either the left or right 45-degree polarized light passes either a vertical or a horizontal filter
with an imperfect .5 probability

cos2 (45°) =

( )
1
2

2

= .5 . Similarly, a vertically or horizontally polarized light will pass

either 45-degree filter with the same imperfect probability. Imperfect in the sense of not 0 or 1 probability. We will use
these two bases. The horizontal/vertical pair (+), and the two 45-degree-vector pair (X). Each pair is a pair of mixed states
when measured in the other basis. We sometimes call these pairs “filter sets.”
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MORE DETAIL ON THE FILTER SETS AND THEIR USE BY ALICE AND BOB
Alice's Initial Filter Choice (1 of 4)
1

0

0

1

Bit Interpretation

Filter
Choice
Polarized Photons

Polarized Photons

Bob's Filter (1 of 4)

1

1

1/0

Bob's Filter (1 of 4)

1/0

1/0

Interpretation of Results

0

1/0

1

1

Interpretation of Results

Bob's Filter (1 of 4)

0

1/0

1/0

Interpretation of Results

Bob's Filter (1 of 4)

1/0

1/0

0

0

Interpretation of Results

Figure10. Possible Photon Filtrations – Two Sets of Two Filters. The(+) Set and the (X) Set.

Bars mean NO PHOTON measured. 0 or 1 means a photon is received and will eventually, after Alice’s call, be interpreted
as a valid bit. 1/0 means a photon is received and will eventually, after Alice’s call, be interpreted as an INVALID –
UKNOWABLE bit. Notice that a photon IS received in 3 out of 4 possible cases. No photon is received in 1 out of 4 cases.
Bob does get the picture

Alice chooses a filter (one of four) corresponding to the bit she wants to send. She sends a photon filtered through that filter,
therefore polarized in that direction. Bob chooses a filter (one of four) and gets a measured result, which he interprets after
Alice’s call. The gray cases are cases where Bob chose the wrong filter SET. These will turn out to be ambiguous cases after
the phone call. Whatever actual bit Bob interprets in a gray case, has only a 50% chance of being correct (QM here). He
will not know that until Alice calls him with information about her filter choices. He will drop the mismatched-filter
(unknowable) bits from consideration after the call.
The lined cases are where Bob actually measures no photon. This indicates that he has chosen the correct set but the wrong
one of the pair, which is 90 degrees out of phase with the filter Alice used, so it totally filters out the photon of light.
Cos2(90) = 0 (QM here). This is perfect knowledge. He knows exactly which photon was sent – the one 90 degrees out of
phase with the one he attempted to measure! He knows this even before Alice’s call. Optional Eve won’t know this.
Notice that when Alice phones Bob and tells him only the filter SET she used, he still knows exactly which bit she sent - if he
used either one of that pair. If he measured a bit, the filter pair matched so his filter also matches hers. If he measured no
photon, he chose the other filter of the pair, so he knows what filter of the pair she chose – and therefore again, the bit value.
If on the other hand he had chosen a filter from the wrong pair, he has only a 50/50 chance of having received (measured) the
correct bit – so he discards these mismatched and potentially misleading bits. Bob then lets Alice know which pairs he had
that matched. This leaves a subset of the originally sent bits that they both know. There is one more step but first – all about
Eve.
Eve doesn’t get the whole picture

The same diagram holds for Eve, the photon eavesdropper. If Eve also listens in to the Alice-Bob phone call she has the
same Alice side information as Bob. She does not know Bobs filter choices. Her filter choices will differ by probability
since she too made random filter choices! She will eventually know, from Alice’s phone call, exactly what filters she chose
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that match Alice’s. Eve would not know Bob’s filter set choices either. When he tells Alice his choices, Eve can see where
she matched both, so she would know some of the bits (where she matched Alice and Bob) but not all of the bits where Bob
matched Alice and she didn’t. Since Bob’s choice determines the final set, she might have some of the final set of bits
correct but certainly (tech term) not all. This means, she would not know all of the bits Alice and Bob agreed upon. Those
will be a symmetric one-time-pad. This is inherently a probabilistic argument that gets better the longer the string of bits.
In fact, simulator runs with very short strings (1 to 4 bits) show that sometimes Eve CAN get it right.
Worse yet, Eve gets caught (detected) (QM here).

There is a “No Cloning” theorem that states that you can’t copy a quantum state without measuring it (Nielsen and Chang,
2000). Eve can’t clone an Alice photon, pass on an unmeasured perfect copy to Bob, and measure her other copy. If she
could, then, Bob would be receiving exactly the photons Alice sent. However, as we shall see, he probably doesn’t always
get an unmodified photon if Eve looks at it first and then forwards it.
When Eve forwards the photons to Bob after measuring them, all will be copies of what she measured, not copies of the true
original bits (polarized photons). Since she has measured about 50% in error (chance of choosing the wrong filter pair) Bob
will be measuring these wrong Eve outputs as his pseudo-Alice inputs. These will show up when Alice phones Bob and tells
him her filter pair choices. She will also pick a subset of the bits they finally agree upon and she tells Bob the actual bits she
sent for that subset. Since some of these bits would be corrupted bits sent by Eve, those error bits Bob measures won’t agree
with Alice’s sent bits even though the filter set agreed. This indicates that the transmission has been modified (by an Eve). If
any bits disagree, all bits must be dropped since they are compromised. In actuality this too becomes a probability-based
argument.

Alice's Initial Filter
1

Bit Interpretation

Filter
Choice

1

Probability Bob will
measure a correct
photon = .5 = (2 of 4)

1

1/0

1/0

Bob's correct
filter choice
P = (2 of 4)
Without Eve, Bob's probability of measuring the
correct photon is .5 . Alice's phone call
determines the filter SET matches and so a
subset of the bits. Without Eve, 100% of the
subset bits from filter matches will match.
Figure 11. An example – no Eve. (see Fig. 12 below for the Eve case)
Where did Quantum Mechanics come in?

First, in the behavior of photon going through the wrong filter set. They still go through, but come out polarized along the
direction of the filter and not they way they went in. They do this with a probability that goes as the square of the cosine of
the angle between the input photon and the filter axis. This is the QM representation of a mixed state in a basis. It is not a
pure state. Photons are energy packets of light that have spin (not used here) and electric field polarization (Mathpages,
2003).
Second, when a photon is measured in a state by a filter it is in a pure state, parallel to the filter axis. If it then goes through
an identical filter it is unmodified (square of cosine of 0 degrees = 1). If it goes through the other filter of the pair, it is
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destroyed. The probability of it coming through is the square of the cosine of 90 degrees = 0. I.e., it doesn’t come through.
When we measure no photon with a filter, we are absolutely sure it was parallel to the complimentary filter of the pair (set).
Third, by the No Cloning theorem, we know EVE can’t send on perfect replicas of the photons she intercepted. Therefore
some photons she sends on are not the photons Alice sent. That results in a measurable difference in the final agreed upon set
of bits. This bit disagreement is enough of a difference to detect Eve’s existence. This is all probabilistic in nature.

Alice's Initial Filter
1

Bit Interpretation

Filter
Choice
EVE's Filter equiprobable choice
just like Bob's

1

1

1/0

1/0

Bob's correct filter choice
(2 of 4)

1

1

1/0

1/0

Probability Eve will
generate an incorrect
polarized photon = .5
Probability Eve will
pass on a correct
photon = .5
Probability Bob will
measure a correct
photon =
.5 (in) x (2 of 4) =.25
instead of = .5

With an Eve, Bob's probability of measuring the correct
photon is .25 instead of .5 . Alice's phone call
determines the flter matches and a subset of the "good"
bits. With an Eve, 50% of these bits will NOT match.
Figure 12. An example – there is an Eve.
DISCUSSION OF THE PREREQUISITES TOPICS MODULE

The vector/matrix topics can be limited to just a discussion of the 45-degree triangle case and the representation of vectors in
bases with the 2-D case as an example. Eigenvalues and eigenvectors don’t appear as such because we don’t use the explicit
operator. The “review” by statement of the informal quantum mechanics axioms is also probably a good cultural topic
because apparently about 30% of the United States Gross Domestic Product derives from industries based on quantum
mechanics (Waite and Mauboussin, 2002).
Probability

The student needs only the definition of discrete probability and can get a good feel for its effects by running cases on a
simulator. For example, for short bit strings (~5), Eve can get it right for even shorter matching sub strings (~1) once in a
few runs. The probability of Eve getting it right for a long string is very low, and still essentially 0 over many long strings.
CONCLUSION

We can follow the algorithm, get a feel for where quantum mechanics comes in, and why QM gives us a procedure with
secure characteristics. We only need to quote some basic QM axioms, and one QM theorem (that makes sense considering
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the axioms). We use only 2-D vectors for state representations and their components on one other basis set at a 45-degrees
rotation. All in all this is not a lot of background for enabling a reasonable level of understanding.
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